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Abstract: Many models of the evolution of cooperation have shown the importance of direct reciprocity (for
example “tit for tat” strategies) or alternatively indirect reciprocity (conspicuous altruism based on a reputa-
tion or “image score”). In the latter case many models make the implicit assumption that group sizes are large
relative to the expected number of interactions, whichmakes their analysis more tractable in several ways, not
least by allowing us to ignore any strategic interaction between the direct and indirect classes of reciprocation
strategy. However, in smaller groups the possibility arises that both classes of strategy will play a role in de-
termining the equilibrium behaviour. Therefore we introduce a replicator dynamics model which incorporates
both direct and indirect reciprocity, and use simulation and numerical methods to quantitatively assess how
the level of cooperation in equilibrium is aected by changes in the group size and the frequency with which
other groupmembers are encountered. Our analysis shows that, for intermediate group sizes, direct reciprocity
persists in equilibrium alongside indirect reciprocity. In contrast to previous simulation studies, we provide a
sound game-theoretic underpinning to our analysis, and examine the precise conditions which give rise to a
mix of both forms of reciprocity.
Keywords: Evolution, Cooperation, Reciprocity
Introduction
1.1 Dunbar (1996) conjectures that many of the features of human cognition and neuro-anatomy that are unique
compared to other species, for example large brain size and linguistic capabilities, can be explained by selec-
tion pressure for larger group sizes in the ancestral environment (the social brain hypothesis (Dunbar 1998)).
Although larger group sizes have many benefits, for example increased protection from predators, there are
also many costs and unique challenges for species that attempt to exploit a niche by cooperating with other
individuals.
1.2 Cooperation occurs when an individual takes an action which benefits another but at a cost to itself. Coopera-
tors can be successful when their help is reciprocated. Reciprocation occurs when cooperators receive benefits
in turn from the actions of others. When others do not reciprocate, we say that they defect or free-ride. The
benefits to a cooperatormay accrue directly from those who have been helped by the individual, in which case
it is called direct reciprocity.
1.3 The classical example of cooperation via direct reciprocity is illustrated by the tit-for-tat strategy in the repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1997). In this game, pairs of agents repeatedly
interact over many rounds of play. In each round, both players simultaneously choose whether to cooperate
(C), or to defect (D). The resulting payos are given in Table 1 where R is the reward for cooperation, P is the
penalty for defection, T is the payo that results in a temptation to defect, and S is the so-called “sucker’s
payo”. If these values satisfy T > R > P > S then the game qualifies as a prisoner’s dilemma.
1.4 Play then proceeds overmany rounds with random stopping, and players are able to change their choice of co-
operationordefectioncontingenton thehistoryofplay. Axelrod (1997)helda computerisedPrisoner’sDilemma
tournament and famously a strategy called “tit-for-tat” won the competition. This strategy cooperates condi-
tionally based on the action chosen by its partner in the previous round of play; if the opponent cooperates
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C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
Table 1: Payos for a single stage of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
then tit-for-tat reciprocates with cooperation. On the other hand it defects if, and only if, the opposing player
defected in the previous round. If tit-for-tat encounters unconditional cooperators or other tit-for-tat players,
then this results in direct reciprocity. Direct reciprocity occurs when cooperation is directly reciprocated by the
partner who received the benefits of the cooperative act.
1.5 On the other hand, indirect reciprocity occurs when a cooperative action is not reciprocated directly, but rather
via a third-party who did not receive the original benefits. Indirect reciprocity can occur when agentsmake use
of the reputation, or “image score”, of other agents in conditioning their strategy, in contrast to the personal
history of interactions which typically bootstraps direct reciprocity. Nowak & Sigmund (1998a) model indirect
reciprocity using a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma called a donation game. As with the prisoner’s dilemma,
pairs of agents interact overmany rounds of plays and the resulting payos are given in Table 1. The payos are
chosen such thatR = γ(k − 1), S = −γ, T = γk and P = 0, where γ > 0 is a constant representing the cost
of cooperation, and k > 1 is a constant which determines the cost/benefit ratio. Here the act of cooperation
can be interpreted as a donation fromone agent to another, where the recipient receives somemultiple greater
than one of the original investment.
1.6 Provided that the cost/benefit ratio is greater than one, then a social surplus can be generated through recip-
rocation. This allows us to model cooperation in group settings which closely resemble social dilemmas that
occur in nature. For example, intuitively, in an ecological context, we might interpret the interaction between
agents as an allo-grooming activity in which the positive fitness payo γk represents the fitness gains from
parasite elimination, whereas the fitness cost−γ represents the opportunity cost of foregoing other activities,
such as foraging, during the time γ allocated for grooming (Russell & Phelps 2013).
1.7 Nowak & Sigmund (2005) start with the donation game, and introduce an “image score”, which is an integer
counter which is incremented every time an agent cooperates, and decremented every time an agent defects.
They show that strategies which cooperate conditional on whether their partner’s image-score is positive —
which they call discriminators— are able to survive in equilibrium under various models of natural selection.
1.8 Note that both direct and indirect reciprocity make use of information about the other players in the game.
Direct-reciprocity, as embodied by tit-for-tat, makes use of direct observations of others’ behaviour, and re-
quires the player to personally remember the choices made by the other players they have interacted with.
On the other hand, indirect reciprocity, as embodied by discriminatory cooperation, uses information that is
shared with all players. We might expect the success of each form of reciprocity to be contingent on the reli-
ability and availability of the underlying information used by each strategy. Moreover, we should expect the
availability and quality of this information to vary between settings.
1.9 Many theoretical models of the evolution of cooperation via reciprocity start with the assumption that agents
interact in groups that are large relative to the expected number of pairwise interactions. These simplemodels
are analytically tractable. However, in small or intermediate sized groups, the analysis is complicated by the
fact that strategies based on both direct and indirect reciprocity can interact.
1.10 This is of utmost importance if we are to take these models seriously as explanations of actual cooperative
behaviour in the real-world since many collective-action problems, in both human and non-human societies,
occur between small groups of agents. For example, in human societies collective-action problems can occur
between small numbers of nation states in the context of trade and climate negotiations (Tietenberg 1985).
Moreover, although we sometimes think of human societies as vastly interconnected, this is a parochial per-
spective; until very recently most people did not live in cities in developed nations, but rather in small isolated
agricultural communities in the least developed countries (Ostrom 1990, 2000; Diamond 2013). In nature, the
representative group sizes of many non-human social animals are typically of the order of between 10 and 102
individuals (Baird & Dill 1996; Packer et al. 1990), and even single-celled organisms have demographic con-
straints limiting interactions to groups sizes of the order of 103 individuals (Cremer et al. 2012). Finally, in the
context of artificial agents there are many scenarios which constrain interactions to smaller groups of agents;
for example, geographic and spacial constraints can lead to coordination problems between small numbers of
autonomous vehicles, e.g. at traic intersections (Arsie et al. 2009).
1.11 In this paper we introduce a framework for studying the cooperation in groups of varying size and intimacy,
which incorporates reputation in the form of indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund 2005) together with direct
reciprocity in the form of tit-for-tat strategies (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981).
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1.12 We begin with a review of existing studies of trust and reputation: in Section we discuss one of the simplest
models for studying trust and cooperation — the Prisoners’ Dilemma — which has been extensively studied
both theoretically and experimentally (with both human and computerised agents), and review various refine-
ments and extensions to the basic game. We proceed to discuss some of the issues inherent in achieving stable
cooperation in groups where more than two agents interact, and review more advanced models that attempt
to incorporate reputation. In Section we describe our model of cooperation in detail. In Section we describe
our methodology detailing how we solve the model numerically. Finally we present our results in Section and
conclude in Section .
RelatedWork
2.1 There have been a number of experimental studies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with human subjects in which
tit-for-tat like strategies are commonly observed to be voluntarily used, e.g. (Wedekind & Milinski 1996).
2.2 However, Roberts & Sherratt (1998) noted that tit-for-tat like strategies are not always observed in ecological
field studies, and postulate that this is because the original model cannot account for dierential levels of co-
operation. They studied a simulated evolutionary tournament of a variant of the game that allows for dier-
ent levels of cooperation, and found that a strategy raise-the-stakes was an evolutionary stable outcome. In
later work Roberts & Renwick (2003) studied human subjects and found that they used a strategy similar to
raise-the-stakes. This strategy starts o with a small level of cooperation and then rises to maximal coopera-
tion dependent on the other player’s level of cooperation in previous rounds. The behaviour of this strategy is
qualitatively consistentwith the self-reportedbehaviour of human subjects in longitudinal studies of friendship
development as reported by Hays (1985). However, the latter study was restricted to North American students
in their first year of study, and the model of Roberts & Sherratt (1998) has been questioned due to its reliance
on discrete increments (Killingback & Doebeli 1999).
2.3 These earlier studies focused on social dilemmas which involve only dyadic interactions. However, in reality
many social dilemmas arise whenmany agents interact with each other. In many-agent interactions, two key
additional considerations come into play, which we discuss in turn below.
2.4 Firstly, the social-structure in which a population of agents are embedded can have a significant eect on the
outcome. For example, the topology of the social-network can have a significant eect; in particular, scale-free
networks can promote cooperation without the need for conditional reciprocation (Santos et al. 2006b). This
assumes that the social network is a given, which then constraints collective-action, but it may bemore appro-
priate to view social-structure as arising from collective-action; Santos et al. (2006a) allow for the possibility
that the social network can change as agents break connections with defectors, and form new links chosen
at random from the neighbourhood of the severed node, and Phelps (2013) introduces a model which allows
agents to choose new nodes with which to connect based on reputation information. Thus, it may be more
appropriate to view social structure and strategies based on conditional reciprocation as being in co-evolution
with each-other.
2.5 The second issue with many-player interactions is that as the group grows larger, information about previous
encounters with particular individuals becomes less useful simply because the probability of re-encountering
the same individual grows smaller. In this case strategies like tit-for-tat are not suicient on their own toprevent
free-riding in larger groups.
2.6 Tit-for-tat relies on private information that has been obtained directly fromprevious personal encounters with
other agents. However, there are other potential sources of information about the propensity of agents to co-
operate. Nowak and Sigmund (Nowak & Sigmund 1998a,b, 2005) use an evolutionary game-thoereticmodel to
analyse the eect of reputation informationwhich is globally available to all agents in a population, which they
call “image scoring”. The central idea is that defection and cooperation are globally tracked andmade available
in a public score; agents can increase their image score by cooperating, but when they defect their score is re-
duced. Thus, when decidingwhether or not to cooperatewith an agent, indirect information about that agent’s
propensity to cooperate is now available.
2.7 This information is indirect because it hasnotbeenobtainedbypersonal experience, but ratherbya third-party.
In turn, if agents now cooperate conditional on a positive image score, the presence of such discriminators can
lead to indirect reciprocity; cooperating with somebody not because they are expected to reciprocate directly,
but because the reputation so gained will encourage cooperation from strangers. Nowak & Sigmund (1998a)
showed that, under some restrictive assumptions, provided the population contains a suicient fraction of dis-
criminators at the outset, then natural selection will eventually eliminate all defectors from the population.
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2.8 Although the framework of evolutionary game-theory used in these models was originally formulated to de-
scribe the process of natural selection operating on genes, the same mathematical formalism can be used to
describe a process of cultural evolution in which agents learn, rather than evolve, by imitating the strategies
of other agents who appear to be more successful (Boyd & Richerson 1988; Weibull 1997; Kendal et al. 2009;
Phelps &Wooldridge 2013). Indeed, Nowak and Sigmund’s theoretical models are supported by evidence from
empirical studies in which human subjects are observed tomake-use of image-scores in social dilemma games
played in the laboratory (Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Seinen & Schram 2006).
2.9 Nowak and Sigmund analysed their original models under the assumption that the size of the population is
very large. This assumptionmakesmodellingmore tractable sincemany terms in themodel become zero in the
limit as the number of agents tends to infinity, andmoreover it is not necessary to consider interaction between
strategies based on indirect versus direct reciprocity, since the probability of re-encounter is negligible.
2.10 However, given that in reality many interactions do occur within smaller groups or populations, it is surprising
that relatively little attention has been given in the literature to understanding the quantitative relationship
between the size of the group and the resulting level of cooperation, when the eects of dierent forms of
reciprocity are considered.
2.11 It is a well known empirical observation that in a traditional public-goods setting, free-riding increases as the
group size increases (Olson 1965; Kollock 1998; Nosenzo et al. 2013). Although there have been some attempts
to explain such phenomena theoretically, typical models do not explicitly consider the quantitative relation-
ship between the group size and the resulting form and reliability of information available to strategies which
are based on trust and reputation. For example, Heckathorn (1996) provides a conceptual framework which
formulates public-goods games in terms of an underlying evolutionary game played between pairs of players
randomly chosen from a larger population. Their model assumes that reputation-based strategies can acquire
perfect information about their opponent’s propensity to cooperate simply by paying a fixed information cost,
without considering how this information is actually acquired, and how its reliabilitymight vary with the group
size. Under this restrictive assumption, the size of the population has no bearing on the final level of contribu-
tion to the public-good.
2.12 However, it is interesting to ask whether similar results would be obtained if we drop this assumption, and ex-
plicitly consider how reputation information is obtained. This entails explicitly modelling direct and indirect
reciprocity. A priori, we should expect the group size to have a significant eect on the outcome. For example,
in a small population, it may pay for an individual to switch to between direct reciprocity and reputation de-
pending on the make-up of the rest of the group: in a population dominated by direct reciprocity there is little
incentive to build a reputation. Similarly if the rest of the population oer help conditional on reputation. This
reasoning suggests that the dynamics of switching between these two types of strategy would play an impor-
tant role in determining the steady-state outcome.
2.13 Agent-basedmodels have been used to analyse asymptotic outcomes in small populations inwhich agents can
use both direct and indirect reciprocity in order to condition their donations (Conte & Paolucci 2002; Bravo &
Tamburino 2008; Roberts 2008; Boero et al. 2010; Phelps 2013). These simulation analyses demonstrate that
both forms of reciprocity can persist in steady-state, either when agents use individual-learning to adjust their
strategy (Phelps 2013), or when strategies evolve through natural selection (Bravo & Tamburino 2008; Roberts
2008). Although thesemodels are able to account for both forms of reciprocity in smaller groups, their reliance
on simulation methods means that they are not able to provide a systematic exploration of the dynamics of
learning which lead to asymptotically-cooperative outcomes.
2.14 For example, the model described in Roberts (2008) is able to deal with small populations and genetic dri,
but the analysis is based on a restricted set of initial conditions in which the initial makeup of the population
has equal propensity over all strategies. Similarly, Phelps (2013) provides a qualitative analysis of the dynamics
of the learning, but lacks an account of static equilibria, and analyses only the average level of cooperation
without dierentiating the social-welfare of dierent attractors.
2.15 Bravo & Tamburino (2008) show that image-scoring in a simulated alternating trust game leads to coopera-
tive outcomes under two distinct experimental treatments: one in which agents have a high probability of re-
encountering one another, and another in which re-encounter is extremely improbable. Thus in the former
treatment, the image-score is more likely to encapsulate information about direct experience, whereas in the
latter it encapsulates information from others. However, in this model agents cannot explicitly switch between
using one form of information over the other, and there is no systematic analysis of the strategic interaction
between these two forms of reciprocity other than reporting the final level of cooperation in each separate ex-
perimental treatment.
2.16 Similarly Boero et al. (2010) introduce an agent-based model in which information about the returns of finan-
cial securities is communicated among a population of agents. Agents in this model can cheat bymisreporting
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information. Two experimental treatments are analysed corresponding to trust and reputation: one in which
agents can use their own private experience of previous interactions in order to judge the trustworthiness of
other parties (analogous to direct reciprocity), and another inwhich the first-order accuracy of other agents’ re-
ports is itself shared and communicated (analogous to indirect reciprocity). However, again, as with themodel
of Bravo & Tamburino (2008), the interaction between these two behaviours is not considered, and agents do
not have the ability to switch between them depending on how these strategies perform.
2.17 We address the issues in the aforementioned analyses by introducing a model of cooperation which incorpo-
rates both direct and indirect reciprocity, and analysing it using a methodology called empirical game-theory
(Phelps et al. 2010; Walsh et al. 2002; Wellman 2006), which uses a combination of simulation and rigorous
game-theoretic analysis. By so doing we are able to quantitatively analyse cooperation in smaller groups with-
out making assumptions in the limit, and we are able to gain insights into the strategic interaction between
dierent forms of reciprocal behaviour by analysing both static (Nash) equilibria and also the dynamics of evo-
lution of each of these strategies.
2.18 In the following sectionwe give a formal description of ourmodel before describing the empirical game-theory
methodology in Section .
The Model
3.1 The population consists of a set of agentsA = {a1, a2, . . . , an}. Interaction occurs over discrete time periods
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. During each time period a randomly chosen pair of agents (ai, aj) interact with each other.
We refer to n as the group size andN as the expected number of interactions.
3.2 At each time period t agent ai may choose to invest a certain amount of eort u(i,j,t) ∈ [0, U ] ⊂ R in helping
their partner aj , whereU ∈ R is a parameter determining the maximum investment. This results in a negative
fitness payo−u to the donor, and a positive fitness payo ku to the recipient of help aj :
φ(j,t+1) = φ(j,t) + k · u(i,j,t)
φ(i,t+1) = φ(i,t) − u(i,j,t)
where φ(i,t) ∈ R denotes the fitness of agent ai at time t, and k ∈ R is a constant parameter.
3.3 In the special case that N = 2 and n = 2, this model has the same payo structure as the original one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma. However, the more general social dilemma modelled here allows for repeated interac-
tion between dierent pairs of individuals in a larger group n > 2, who can modify their state and remember
the history of play over a number of repeated interactionsN > 2. Once these interactions have occurred, all
the agents’ state is discarded except their accrued fitness, and then evolution proceeds. When the total ex-
pected number of number of interactions,N , is large relative ton then repeated encounters between the same
pairs of individuals are less likely, and intuitively we should expect this to negatively influence the eicacy of
direct-reciprocity versus indirect-reciprocity, since there is correspondingly less information relating to direct
interactions.
3.4 Since we are interested in the evolution of cooperation, we analyse outcomes in which agents switch between
values ofu thatmaximise their own fitnessφi. Provided that k > 1, overmany bouts of interaction it is possible
for agents to enter into reciprocal relationships that aremutually-beneficial, since the donor’s initial costumay
be reciprocated with k × u yielding a net benefit ku − u = u(k − 1). Provided that agents reciprocate, they
can increase their net benefit by investing larger values of u. However, by increasing their investment they put
themselvesmoreat risk fromexploitation, since just as in thealternatingprisoner’sdilemma(Nowak&Sigmund
1994), defection is the dominant strategy if the total number of boutsN is known: the optimal behaviour is to
accept the helpwithout any subsequent investment in others. In the casewhereN isunknown, and the number
of agents is n = 2, it is well known that conditional reciprocation is one of several equilibria in the form of the
so-called tit-for-tat strategywhich copies the action that the opposing agent chose in the preceding bout at t−1
(Miller 1996). However, this result does not generalise to larger groups n > 2 (Fader & Hauser 1988).
3.5 Nowak & Sigmund (1998b) demonstrate that indirect reciprocity can emerge in large groups, provided that in-
formation about each agent’s history of actions is summarised andmade publicly available in the formof a rep-
utationor “image-score” r(i,t) ∈ [rmin, rmax] ⊂ Z. The image-score ri summarises thepropensity-to-cooperate
of agent ai. As in the Nowak and Sigmund model, image scores in our model are initialised ∀i r(i,0) = 0 and
are bound at rmin = −5 and rmax = 5. An agent’s image score is incremented at t + 1 if the agent invests a
JASSS, 19(2) 4, 2016 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/19/2/4.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3060
non-zero amount at time t, otherwise it is decremented:
r(i,t+1) = min(r(i,t) + 1, rmax) ⇐⇒ u(i,x,t) > 0
r(i,t+1) = max(r(i,t) − 1, rmin) ⇐⇒ u(i,x,t) = 0
and agents invest conditionally on their partner’s image score:
u(i,j,t) =
{
γ : r(j,t) ≥ σi
0 : r(j,t) < σi
whereσi is a parameter determining the threshold image score abovewhich agent ai will cooperate, and γ ∈ R
is a global parameter.
3.6 In general, it is the cost-benefit ratio γ/γk = 1/k relative to the social viscosity of the group that determines
whether or not cooperation persists in equilibrium (Nowak 2006). Accordingly, in our analysis we hold the cost-
benefit ratio constant by choosing fixed parameter values for γ and k while systematically varying the number
of agents n, and the expected number of rounds of playN , as described in the next section. We also repeat the
analysis with k = 3.5.
3.7 Nowak & Sigmund (1998a) demonstrate that the conditions under which cooperation is achieved depend on
the presence of discriminators; that is, agents which use a threshold of σi = 0 and thus only cooperate with
others if they have a good reputation. In their paper they show that if the initial fraction of discriminators in
the population is above a critical value then the population converges to a mix of discriminators and cooper-
ators, and defectors are completely eliminated. This implies that strategies based on indirect reciprocity via
reputation are an essential prerequisite for the evolution of cooperation in large groups.
3.8 The abovemodel contrasts with that of Roberts & Sherratt (1998) who study interactions in which agents make
their investment decision solely on the basis of private information about the history of previous interactions.
In their model an agent ai decides on the level of investment to give aj as a function ψi of the most recent
encounter with aj :
u(i,j,t) = ψi(u(j,i,t′)) (1)
In our model, we are interested in the interplay between both of these forms of decision making, and thus we
allow agents to use either form of decision function with a view to exploring the tension between reputation
and personal experience as a basis for ailiative behaviour.
3.9 We are particularly interested in the eect of group size n and the number of interactionsN on the evolution
of cooperation. The analytical model of Nowak & Sigmund (1998a) assumes: a) that the group size n is large
enough relative toN that strategies based on private history, such as tit-for-tat, are irrelevant (since the proba-
bility of encountering previous partners is very small); and b) that the we do not need to take into account the
fact that an agent cannot cooperate with itself when calculating the probability with which any given agent is
likely to encounter a particular strategy.
3.10 However, in order to model changes in group size, and hence interaction in smaller groups, it is necessary to
drop both of these assumptions. The resulting model is more complicated, and it is not possible to derive
closed-form solutions for the equilibrium behaviour. Therefore we use simulation to estimate payos, and nu-
merical methods to compute asymptotic outcomes, as described in the next section.
Methodology
4.1 In order to study the evolution of populations of agents using the above strategies, we use methods based on
evolutionarygame-theory. However, rather thanconsideringpairsof agents chosen randomly froman idealised
very large population, our analysis concerns interactions amongst smaller groupsof sizen > 2 assembled from
a larger population of individuals. The resulting game-theoretic analysis is complicated by the fact that this
results in a many-player game, which presents issues of tractability for the standard methods for computing
the equilibria of normal-form games.
4.2 Heuristic approaches are oen used when faced with tractability issues such as these. In particular, heuris-
tic optimisation algorithms, such as genetic algorithms, are oen used to model real adaptation in biological
settings (Bullock 1997). The standard heuristic approach to modelling multi-agent interactions is to use a Co-
evolutionary algorithm (Hillis 1992; Miller 1996). In a co-evolutionary optimisation, the fitness of individuals
in the population is evaluated relative to one another in joint interactions (similarly to payos in a strategic
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game), and it is suggested that in certain circumstances the converged population is an approximate Nash so-
lution to the underlying game; that is, the stable states, or equilibria, of the co-evolutionary process are related
to the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the corresponding game. However, there are many caveats to in-
terpreting the equilibrium states of standard co-evolutionary algorithms as approximations of game-theoretic
equilibria, as discussed in detail by Ficici & Pollack (1998, 2000).
4.3 In order to address this issue, we adopt the empirical game-theorymethodology (Phelps et al. 2010;Walsh et al.
2002;Wellman2006),whichusesacombinationof simulationand rigorousgame-theoretic analysis. Theempir-
ical game-theory method uses a heuristic payo matrix which is computed by running very many simulations,
as detailed below.
4.4 The payo matrix is said to be heuristic because several simplifying assumptions are made in the interests of
tractability. We can make one important simplification by assuming that the game is symmetric, and there-
fore that the payo to a given strategy depends only on the number of agents within the group adopting each
strategy. Thus for a game with j strategies, we represent the payomatrix as a map f : Zj → Rj .
4.5 For a given a mapping
f(p¯) = q¯
in the payomatrix, the vector
p¯ = (p1, . . . , pj)
represents the group composition, where pi specifies the number of agents who are playing the ith strategy,
and q¯ represents the outcome in the form
q¯ = (q1, . . . , qj)
where qi specifies the expected payo to the ith strategy.
4.6 For a game with n agents, the number of entries in the payomatrix is given by
s =
(
n+ j − 1
n
)
=
(n+ j − 1)!
n!(j − 1)!
For example, for n = 10 agents and j = 5 strategies, we have a payomatrix with s = 1001 entries.
4.7 For each entry in the payo matrix we estimate the expected payo to each strategy by running a total of 105
simulations and taking the mean1 fitness rounded according to the corresponding standard error.
4.8 For example, if we have an entry in the payomatrix
p¯ = (5, 4, 1, 0, 0)
then we would run 105 simulations with n = 5 + 4 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 10 agents, five of which would be initialised
to use the first strategy, four to use the second strategy, one using the third strategy, and zero agents using the
remaining strategies. The process for deriving a heuristic payomatrix is illustrated in Figure 1.
4.9 Withestimatesof thepayos toeach strategy inhand,weare in aposition tomodel theevolutionof populations
of agents using these strategies. In our evolutionary model, we do not restrict reproduction to within-group
mating; rather, we consider a larger population which temporarily forms groups of size n in order to perform
some ecological task. Thus we use the standard replicator dynamics equation (Weibull 1997) tomodel how the
frequency of each strategy in the larger population changes over time in response to the within-group payos:
m˙i = [u(ei, m¯)− u(m¯, m¯)]mi (2)
where m¯ is a mixed-strategy vector, u(m¯, m¯) is the mean payo when all players play m¯, and u(ei, m¯) is the
average payo to pure strategy i when all players play m¯, and m˙i is the first derivative ofmi with respect to
time. Strategies that gain above-average payo become more likely to be played, and this equation models a
simple co-evolutionary process of adaptation.
4.10 Each of the individual simulations consists of the iterative process illustrated in Figure 2.
4.11 In our analysis we solve this system numerically: we choose 103 randomly sampled initial values which are
chosen uniformly from the unit simplex by sampling fromaDirichlet distribution (Kotz et al. 2000), and for each
of these initial mixed-strategies we solve Eq. 2 as an initial value problemusing R (R Core Team 2013; Soetaert &
Petzoldt 2011). This results in 103 trajectories which either terminate at stationary points, or enter cycles. This
process is illustrated in Figure 3 below.
4.12 We consider j = 4 strategies:
1. C which cooperates unconditionally (σi = rmin);
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0 0 3
0 1 2
1 0 2
simulate 3 defectors
...
simulate 1 discriminator with 2 defectors
simulate 1 cooperator with 2 defectors
0.0
-0.03 0.015
-0.006 0.03
...Continue for 
remaining 7 entries 
in the payoff matrix
Calculate mean fitness by 
strategy across all 
10,000 simulations
p
1
p
2
p
3
C S D
For i = 1 to 10,000
For i = 1 to 10,000
For i = 1 to 10,000
q
1
q
2
q
3
C S D
Figure 1: Computing the heuristic payomatrix f(p¯) = q¯ for n = 3 agents and j = 3 strategies.
Initialise agent i and
set image score
σ
i
 = 0
For i = 1 to n
Randomly choose 2 out of n agents
Simulate single round of
donation game
Record payoffs and update image scores
For i = 1 to N
Figure 2: Flowchart for a single simulation.
2. D which defects unconditionally (σi = rmax + 1);
3. S which cooperates conditionally with agents who have a good reputation (σi = 0) but cooperates un-
conditionally when reputations have not yet been established;
4. T which cooperates with agent aj provided that aj cooperated with ai on the previous encounter, and
cooperates unconditionally against unseen opponents.
4.13 Although this spaceof strategies is limited, and there aremany variants of thediscriminatory strategywhich, for
example, usedierent assessment rules for ascribing reputationdependingon the reputationof both thedonor
and the recipient (Nowak&Sigmund 2005), we restrict attention to the simplest strategies because of their sim-
plicity andcorrespondinguniversality across species: direct reciprocity hasbeenobserved inprimategrooming
interactions (Barrett et al. 1999), and there is some empirical evidence to suggest that chimpanzees are capa-
ble of at least the simplest assessment rule for indirect reciprocity – “scoring” – asmodelled here (Russell et al.
2008). The image scoring assessment rule is more plausible as a mechanism for understanding reciprocity in,
e.g. primate allo-grooming, because it does not require language or other sophisticated cognitive resources:
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Choose a random vector x of size j
such that ∑x = 1
Numerically Integrate equation (2) 
using initial conditions x and payoffs f
Record state vectors m
i
 yielding a single trajectory,
which can be plotted in the unit simplex.
For i = 1 to 1000
Input: a heuristic payoff matrix f(p) = q
Output: A set of 1000 trajectories,
a subset of which terminate 
at stationary points.
Figure 3: Computing a single phase-space plot.
“Scoring is the ‘foolproof’ concept of ‘I believe what I see’. Scoring judges the action and ignores the stories.”
(Nowak & Sigmund 2005, p. 1294).
4.14 Amajor advantage of our approach over other simulation studies is that there are very few free parameter set-
tings, which are summarised in Table 2. The key values are the parameter settings for the multiplier and cost
values, which determine the cost-benefit ratio. As discussed previously, theoretical considerations suggest that
it is the social-viscosity relative to the cost-benefit ratiowhich determines the asymptotic outcome, andwe sys-
tematically vary the former as described in the next section. The values γ = 10−1 and k = 10 were chosen to
correspond to those of the original simulation study of Nowak & Sigmund (1998a)- see p. 569 therein, but we
also analyse the model with a dierent multiplier of k = 3.5 to test the robustness of our results.
4.15 The remaining parameters eect numerical estimates and sample sizes. As can be seen we have chosen large
sample sizes, and as shown in the next section the corresponding p-values and standard errors are very small
throughout our study. All of the code used in our experiments is available in the public domain and can be
downloaded under an open source license (Phelps 2011).
Parameter Value(s)
Donation gamemultiplier k {10, 3.5}
Donation game cost γ 10−1
Number of agents n {3, 6, 10}
Expected number of roundsN {5, 10, 15, . . . , 50}
Number of independent simulation runs per entry in the payomatrix 105
Number of randomly sampled initial conditions for the replicator-dynamics integration 103
Time interval used to numerically integrate equation 2 10−1
Table 2: Free parameter settings used in the simulation study.
Results
5.1 Initially we restrict ourselves to a very simple scenario where we have n = 3 agents choosing between two
strategies. Table 3 shows the heuristic payo for three agents choosing between unconditional defectionD or
unconditional cooperationC. The le-hand column shows the number of agents adopting each pure strategy,
and the right-hand column shows the estimated expected payo to each strategy. It is illuminating to com-
pare this with the standard analytical 2-player normal-form payomatrix for our model expressed in the same
combinational form in Table 4. In the analytical two-player case the multiplier k determines the ranking of the
four possible payo combinations, which are denoted T , R, P and S representing the temptation to defect,
the reward for cooperation, the punishment for defection, and the “sucker’s” payo respectively. For only two
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agents the ranking of these payos determines the structure of the social dilemma. In the case that k > 1 then
T > R > P > S which is the classical prisoner’s dilemma. However, when there are more than two agents,
there are more payo combinations. In Table 3 we see that when one cooperator interacts with two defectors,
the temptation to defect is lessened since the two defectors interact with each other as well as the cooperator.
On the other hand, the single cooperator in this case suers the full sucker’s payo. This can be contrasted
with next row in the table where we have two cooperators interacting with a single defector. Here the temp-
tation to defect is strong since the defector can fully exploit the cooperators without suering any defection,
but the sucker’s payo is compensated by the reward from cooperation arising from the interaction of the two
cooperators.
n(C) n(D) u(C) u(D)
0 3 0
1 2 -0.1 0.5
2 1 0.4 1.0
3 0 0.9
Table 3: Heuristic payo matrix for n = 3 agents choosing between unconditional cooperationC, or uncondi-
tional defectionD
n(C) n(D) u(C) u(D)
0 2 P = 0
1 1 S = −γ = −0.1 T = γk = 1
2 0 R = γ(k − 1) = 0.9
Table 4: Analytical payomatrix for n = 2 agents
5.2 Although Table 3 could have been obtained analytically, the situation becomesmuchmore subtle and complex
when we introduce additional agents, and additional strategies representing reciprocity. We next extend our
analysis to n = 10 agents, j = 3 strategies, resulting in a payo matrix with 264 rows. Rather than tabulate
the numerically-obtained payos, we proceed directly to analysing this heuristic game by sampling 102 initial
values and integrating the replicator dynamics specified by Eq. 2.
5.3 Sincemixed strategies represent population frequencies, the components of m¯ sum to one. Therefore the vec-
tors m¯ lie in the unit-simplex4j−1 = {x¯ ∈ Rj : ∑ji=1 xi = 1}. In the case of j = 3 strategies the unit-simplex
42 is a two-dimensional triangle embedded in a three-dimensional space which passes through the coordi-
nates corresponding topure strategymixes: (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and (0, 0, 1). Weusea twodimensional projection
of this triangle to visualise the population dynamics. Figures 4 and 5 show the phase diagram for the popula-
tion frequencies when we analyse the interaction between cooperators (C), defectors (D) and discriminators
(S) when we have a small group of n = 10 agents.
5.4 Each point in the above graphs represents the state of the population at a given moment in time. The triangle
represents the unit simplex; i.e. it contains all vectors whose components sum to one. In the bottom-le corner
(1, 0, 0), 100% of the population consists of cooperators (C); at the top of the simplex (0, 1, 0), 100% of the
population consists of discriminators (S); in the bottom-right corner (0, 0, 1), 100% of the population consists
n(T ) n(S) n(D) u(T ) u(S) u(D)
0 0 3 0.0
0 1 2 -0.03 0.015
1 0 2 -0.006 0.03
0 2 1 0.15 0.03
1 1 1 0.26 0.28 0.04
2 0 1 0.45 0.06
0 3 0 0.9
1 2 0 0.9 0.9
2 1 0 0.9 0.9
3 0 0 0.9
Table 5: Heuristic payomatrix for n = 3 agents andN = 100 iterations
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Figure 4: cooperation, discrimination and defection for n = 100
Figure 5: cooperation, discrimination and defection for n = 13
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Figure 6: Tit-for-tat, discrimination and defection forN = 100
of defectors; in themiddle of the simplex (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) a third of the population is adopting each of the three
strategies, and so-on for all the points in the simplex. The arrows show how the fraction of the population
adopting each strategy changes over time as evolution progresses. The circles represent configurations of the
population which are no longer changing; i.e. they are stationary points under the replicator dynamics.
5.5 As in Nowak & Sigmund (1998a) we find that aminimum initial frequency of discriminators is necessary to pre-
vent widespread convergence to the defection strategy (the basin of attraction whose trajectories terminate in
the bottom right of the simplex).
5.6 Using our analysis, we can quantify how the size of this basin changes in response to the number of pairwise
interactions per generation N . As N is increased from N = 13 (Fig. 5) to N = 100 (Fig. 4), we see that the
basin of attraction of the pure defection equilibrium is significantly decreased, and correspondingly the criti-
cal threshold of initial discriminators necessary to avoid widespread defection. Defection is less likely2 as we
increase the number of interaction relative to the group size.
5.7 In smaller groups it is important to take intoaccount the interactionbetween strategies representingbothdirect
and indirect reciprocity, since there is a non-negligible probability that agents will repeatedly encounter previ-
ous partners; if we increaseN relative to n we need to consider the eect of strategies that take into account
private interaction history (direct reciprocity) as represented by the T strategy.
5.8 Figures 6 and 7 show the co-evolution between the T ,D and S strategies. ForN = 13, the results are virtually
indistinguishable from the scenario in which we substitute T with unconditional cooperationC (Fig. 5). This is
not surprising since the default behaviour of T is to cooperate in the absence of specific information about a
particular partner. However as we increaseN we see that T becomesmore eective; forN = 100 interactions,
D remains a pure-strategy equilibrium, but with a significantly reduced basin-size compared to the scenario
whereS interacts withS andD. Neither form of reciprocation is dominant over the other, suggesting that both
forms of reciprocity could play an important role in smaller groups.
5.9 This is highlighted by an analysis of the heuristic payos for each strategy in a simplified setting where we have
only three agents and three strategies. Table 5 shows the heuristic payo matrix for this setting. Clearly both
the S and T strategies are vulnerable to defectors. However, there is a quantifiable relative dierence in how
well they performagainst defection: indirect reciprocity (S) gains a slightly higher payo than direct reciprocity
strategy (T ) in the case where each agent adopts a dierent strategy (the fih row of Table 5).
5.10 This is not surprising, since the agent using the discriminatory strategy S can gain valuable information by ob-
serving the interaction of the other two agents. The T strategy has no prior information about the behaviour
of the defector, and so sacrifices a significant payo by cooperating on the first move. On the other hand, the
discriminatory strategy has a probability of observing this interaction, in which case it will consistently defect
against the defector on subsequent encounter. Moreover the pure-strategy best-reply for the defecting player
in this situation is to switch to either S or T (row eight or nine). On the other hand, the decision for a player
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Figure 7: Tit-for-tat, discrimination and defection forN = 13
Figure 8: Tit-for-tat, discrimination and defection for n = 3 agents
adopting one of the reciprocating strategies is asymmetric: starting from row five, we can obtain a significantly
higher payo (0.45) by choosing direct reciprocity (T ) in the next row down, as compared with a switch to indi-
rect reciprocity in theprevious row (0.15). Here the informational advantages toapassiveS player are cancelled
out by the fact that the scoring strategy S considered here is unable to distinguish between punishment and
defection3 because a discriminator who fails to help a defector themselves incurs a reputation penalty.
5.11 In small groups, this eect can lead to an increase in the frequency of direct reciprocity. By analysing themixed-
strategy case using the replicator dynamics we can see that although neither S nor T dominate each other,
direct reciprocity attracts a slightly higher following; that is, the distribution of mixed-strategy equilibria con-
taining bothT andS is skewed towardsT . This canbe seen from the slight curvature of the trajectories towards
the T direction in Fig. 8 (we will return to this discussion with greater statistical rigour below).
5.12 We obtain qualitatively similar results as we increase the number of agents to n = 10 while holding N fixed
— Figures 8 and 9 shows how the direction field changes as we move from a smaller (Fig. 8) to a larger (Fig. 9)
group. Here defection becomes slightly more stable, and the curvature of the trajectories in the T direction is
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Figure 9: Tit-for-tat, discrimination and defection for n = 10 agents
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Figure 10: n = 6 agents
slightly less pronounced.
5.13 We analyse the equilibrium frequencies of direct versus indirect reciprocity more systematically by including
all four strategies in our analysis (T , S,C andD), and systematically varyingN . Fig. 10 shows our results when
we hold the number of agents fixed at n = 6 and systematically vary the number of interactionsN . In all cases,
the expected frequency of direct reciprocity is intermediate between the level of cooperation and the level of
indirect reciprocity.
5.14 When repeated encounters are rare, T does not gain useful information and its behaviour, and corresponding
frequency, is identical toC. However, as the viscosity of the group increases andwemove towards the right on
the graphwe see that the frequency of direct reciprocity increases as it gainsmore information. Asymptotically,
its frequency approaches that ofS. In awell-mixed group both forms of reciprocity are eective in reducing the
attractor for all-out defection. As defectors become less prominent, so do the strengths and weaknesses of
each form of reciprocity in dealing with them, and their frequencies converge. Thus as the quality information
available to direct reciprocity increases with increased interaction, we see direct reciprocity in intermediate
frequencies between cooperation and discrimination.
5.15 Although there is some overlap in the standard error of the observed frequencies, we are able to reject the two
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Figure 11: n = 10 agents
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Figure 12: n = 6 agents under conformist bias
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Figure 13: n = 10 agents, with a lower multiplier k = 3.5
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N/n T againstC T against S
0.5 p < 0.63 p < 0.01
1 p < 0.08 p < 0.01
1.5 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
2 p < 0.55 p < 0.01
2.5 p < 0.46 p < 0.01
3 p < 0.09 p < 0.01
3.5 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
4 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
4.5 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
5 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Table 6: p−values under a t-test. We compare the observed frequency of the tit-for-tat strategy (T ) with that of
the cooperate strategy (C) and the discriminatory strategy (S) using a two-sample t-test. Intermediate values
ofN/n show statistically-significant dierence in expected frequencies.
null hypotheses that the frequencies of T versus C, and T versus S are identically distributed. Table 6 shows
the p-values for each hypothesis. For intermediate values of N there is a statistically-significant dierence in the
mean frequencies.
5.16 The inflexion in the graph for small values at N = 5 and N = 10 occurs because of noise in the payos in-
troduced by the fact that with a small number of interactions not every agent is chosen to interact before re-
production or learning occurs. Nevertheless the persistence of indirect reciprocity at intermediate frequencies
between cooperation and discrimination is still robust at this extremity. We obtain similar results when the
number of agents is increased to n = 10 (Fig. 11).
5.17 In the 2-player version of the game the outcomeof the social dilemma is the same for all values of themultiplier
k > 1, since this defines the ranking in payos over the four possible strategy combinations. However, this
does not necessarily hold in the extended version of the game, so wemust take care to explore the eect of the
multiplier. Fig. 13 shows the eect of keeping the number of agents at n = 10, but reducing the multiplier to
k = 3.5. Although, as we would intuitively expect, this reduces the level cooperation, we see that both forms
of reciprocity continue to persist, and that our central result still holds.
5.18 Returning to Figures 6 and 7 we see that each of the stationary points on the edge TS, which represent mixed-
strategy equilibria over direct and indirect reciprocity, are the terminations of trajectories which originate in
the interior of the simplex, which implies that these are also Nash equilibria. This would suggest that mixed-
strategies between direct and indirect reciprocity might be observed under alternative learning dynamics. As
discussed in Section , the replicator dynamics was originally proposed as amodel of genetic evolution but can
also be interpreted as amodel of social learning inwhich strategies replicate through imitation. However, when
strategies are acquired through social learning itmay be diicult for agents to accurately determine their utility
(Boyd&Richerson 1988). In such cases, a useful heuristic todetermine themost useful strategiesmaybe to copy
themost frequently-occurring variant (Kendal et al. 2009; Skyrms 2005). This conformist bias can bemodelled
by introducing a weighting β over the utility u(ei) of a strategy i and its frequency xi:
u′(ei, x) = β × xi + (1− β)× u(ei, x¯) (3)
and then substituting u′ in place of u in the ODE for the replicator dynamics (Eq. 2). Wemight expect any small
dierences in equilibrium outcomes to be amplified by conformity, and indeed this is precisely what is ob-
served. Fig. 12 illustrates the eect of introducing a small amount of conformist bias β = 0.2 into the model.
Dierences in frequencies betweendirect and indirect reciprocity andunconditional cooperation aremore pro-
nounced, andmore rounds of play are required in order to achieve symmetry between direct and indirect reci-
procity. Nevertheless, our central finding is robust under this alternative model; both forms of reciprocity per-
sist, and direct reciprocity is found at intermediate frequencies between cooperation and discrimination.
Conclusion
6.1 We have introduced a framework for analysing reciprocity within small groups of varying size. By using simula-
tion and numerical methods we are able to avoidmaking assumptions contingent on values tending to infinity
or zero, while simultaneously retaining the rigour of a game-theoretic analysis.
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6.2 Our model incorporates both direct and indirect reciprocity, and we showed that for small groups both direct
and indirect reciprocity persist in equilibrium, with neither strategy dominating the other. This finding is robust
to analternativemodel of agents’ adaptationbasedon social learningwith conformist bias, andalsounder low-
viscosity conditions which induce noise. In contrast to previous studies, by using the empirical game-theory
methodology, we have been able to provide a sound game-theoretic underpinning to our analysis, showing
that the results obtained from analytical models are a special case under our analysis. In so doing we have
been able to show that our results are not contingent on a restricted set of initial conditions. Moreover, by
identifying the existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria over direct and indirect reciprocity in a symmetric
game of cooperation, we have shown that in settings where interactions with previously-encountered agents
are likely, it pays to to use trust in addition to reputation in the design of autonomous agents.
6.3 The persistence of both forms of reciprocity occurs as a direct consequence of trade-os inherent in the type
of information each strategy uses; indirect reciprocity can gain useful information about unseen partners, pro-
vided that the scoring information is suiciently accurate to enable selective aid to potential cooperators. How-
ever, there is a negative feedback eect as increasing levels of discrimination coupled with the presence of
defectors introduce unreliable scores due to the attribution issue. In such circumstances, the information pro-
vided by personal experience may bemore reliable.
6.4 This is particularly relevant in a setting with bounds on rationality, which is representative of many real-world
settings; there ismuch evidence to suggest that human strategic interaction is best explained from the perspec-
tive of bounded rationality (Erev & Roth 1998), and this is even more important in non-human species (Russell
et al. 2008; Russell & Phelps 2013). Our findings are therefore also of relevance to biologists who seek to un-
derstand ecological interactions such as allo-grooming in terms of a social dilemma, or a “biological market”
(Barrett et al. 1999; Henzi & Barrett 2002; Newton-Fisher & Lee 2011).
6.5 Although there is a great deal of research applying methods for detection of direct reciprocity to such interac-
tions, in both non-human and human societies, our model suggests that both direct and indirect reciprocity
may both interact, and thus it may be important to developmethods to additionally detect indirect reciprocity
in field data. For example, it is a well-known empirical observation that in directed social-networks from hu-
man studies, a link fromA toB tends to be reciprocated with a link fromB toA; see e.g. Rivera et al. (2010). In
certain contexts, this type of dyadic link reciprocation in a social-network might be interpreted as evidence for
tit-for-tat-like behaviour, i.e. direct reciprocity in an underlying social-dilemma. However, our model suggests
indirect reciprocity should play an equally important role, in which casewe should look for triadic patterns, e.g.
A helps B who helps C who helps A, or more generally cycles in sub-graphs of size n > 2. There is evidence
that such triadic patterns do indeed existing in human social networks (Cross et al. 2001; Rank et al. 2010). In
future work, we will use similar studies to quantitatively validate our model.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the editor, and the anonymous reviewers whose comments, suggestions and corrections led
to a much improved version of this paper. I would also like to thank Andrew Howes, for many discussions and
suggestions on these topics, and detailed corrections to earlier dras of the paper.
Notes
1We take the average fitness of every agent adopting the strategy for which we are calculating the payo,
and then also average across simulations.
2Assuming that all points in the simplex are equally likely as initial values.
3Note that in our previous discussion at the end of Section , we justified our choice of the scoring strategy
on the grounds of its cognitive simplicity and universality in line with the arguments presented in Nowak &
Sigmund (2005).
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